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Abstract. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a means of generating
keys between a pair of computing hosts that is theoretically secure against
cryptanalysis, even by a quantum computer. Although there is much active
research into improving the QKD technology itself, there is still significant
work to be done to apply engineering methodology and determine how it can
be practically built to scale within an enterprise IT environment. Significant
challenges exist in building a practical key management service for use in a
metropolitan network. QKD is generally a point-to-point technique only and is
subject to steep performance constraints. The integration of QKD into enterprise-
level computing has been researched, to enable quantum-safe communication. A
novel method for constructing a key management service is presented that allows
arbitrary computing hosts on one site to establish multiple secure communication
sessions with the hosts of another site. A key exchange protocol is proposed where
symmetric private keys are granted to hosts while satisfying the scalability needs
of an enterprise population of users. The key management service operates within
a layered architectural style that is able to interoperate with various underlying
QKD implementations. Variable levels of security for the host population are
enforced through a policy engine. A network layer provides key generation
across a network of nodes connected by quantum links. Scheduling and routing
functionality allows quantum key material to be relayed across trusted nodes.
Optimizations are performed to match the real-time host demand for key material
with the capacity afforded by the infrastructure. The result is a flexible and
scalable architecture that is suitable for enterprise use and independent of any
specific QKD technology.
Keywords: quantum key distribution, quantum cryptography, software engineering, network
engineering, network security, software architecture, enterprise computing
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21. Introduction
1.1. Background
Secure network communication is a principal function of IT infrastructure. In
particular, secure inter-domain communication is important to larger organizations
that are distributed across multiple geographical sites. Computing hosts on a local
site will regularly establish communication sessions with arbitrary computing hosts of
a remote site. The key management service of an IT security system will typically
provide a data encryption service on top of a standard network protocol. Although
there are many commercially available crypto-systems in use today, the majority of
them rely upon key exchange under public-key cryptography where the computational
problem is infeasible to break using today’s computing technology. However, rapid
advances are occurring in the field of quantum computing. Once a quantum computer
is built to solve problems of a practical scale, currently-deployed conventional public-
key cryptography will become completely vulnerable to attack, and a new way of
protecting transactions over a network will be needed.
New quantum-resistant public-key cryptography, also known as post-quantum
public-key cryptography, is being researched and experimented on, and there is
growing effort toward its global standardization. While promising, and an important
part of the future cryptographic landscape, post-quantum cryptography is still
potentially vulnerable to future (quantum and classical) algorithmic advances. In
particular, there has been limited scrutiny against novel quantum cryptanalysis,
especially considering the lack of a large-scale quantum computer to facilitate the
design and testing of new quantum algorithms and heuristics. Furthermore, post-
quantum key establishment is susceptible to being recorded and cracked at a future
date.
To mitigate the risk of successful attack, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has
been devised, which is based on the laws of quantum physics and is a theoretically
secure form of generating keys that is resistant to attacks by both conventional and
quantum computers. There has been significant research activity over recent years
relating to the theory and implementation of QKD techniques. QKD is already in
operation today in large-scale experiments using commercially-available equipment,
and promising research has been presented on how trusted nodes can be utilized to
build a larger system. However, there is still work to be done to determine how
QKD key management can be practically utilized within an enterprise environment to
flexibly serve a large host population, from a practical engineering perspective. QKD
must evolve from point-to-point links to network designs that can support high user
populations over wide geographical coverage [1].
1.2. Our Contributions and Impact
The overall goal of our work has been to show the feasibility of integrating QKD
technology with classical networks, to uncover unique design challenges and propose
flexible solutions, and to provide a holistic view of a system as a viable target for
migration. We viewed the problem primarily from an engineering lens. Our aim
has been to apply best practices in contemporary security, network, and software
engineering, including leading industry practices, in the application of QKD to
practical real-world systems.
3Our main contribution is the design of a scalable QKD-based system that enables
secure multi-site communication, and is compatible with various QKD technologies.
We provide a scalable service to support enterprise-level secure traffic between
arbitrary hosts in a large metropolitan network comprising sites that may be indirectly
connected. The architecture consists of a full protocol stack, including an enterprise-
level key management layer that manages and issues keys to hosts from a key pool, and
a quantum network layer that performs quantum key generation via trusted nodes.
To maximize efficiency, the key generation system dynamically adapts to changes in
demand and network infrastructure based on real-time monitoring and prediction from
history. Hosts are issued session keys to securely communicate over a conventional
network, while quantum key generation occurs over quantum links that may form an
independent topology. Integrations with standards such as TLS, IPSec, and Kerberos
have also been studied. The results of the research included design artifacts to lay
the groundwork for the implementation of a research test bed or a pilot system for
industry use.
Our work has numerous impacts: it informs QKD practitioners and equipment
designers of the operating requirements of such an enterprise system; it informs
architects of key design choices and trade-offs to make when incorporating QKD
technology into a communications system; and, it demonstrates to software engineers
how client applications can be built to make use of secure QKD key material in
transparent fashion. These insights aim to tackle what sometimes appear to be
insurmountable obstacles in standards acceptance and widespread use of QKD, despite
its compelling intrinsic security benefits. Our research shows how the integration of
QKD has implications on the entire systems design, and we suggest new avenues for
study in the areas of security and network engineering to make QKD practical for
widespread use. We concur with the ultimate goal cited in [2]: to realize a quantum-
safe infrastructure in which post-quantum cryptography, QKD, and physical-layer
cryptography will be integrated.
This article presents a high-level architecture and design of a QKD-enabled
communications system, to show how enabling quantum-safe communication
security poses unique challenges to traditional network engineering; furthermore,
it demonstrates how a feasible solution requires significant interplay between the
various networking domains, from security protocols at the user level to network
management at the infrastructure level. In the rest of this Section 1, related literature
on practical deployment of QKD through protocol and network design is discussed,
followed by a model which describes the typical enterprise network where quantum-
safe communications security is desired. In Section 2, the overall design is presented,
consisting of a layered protocol stack; the functionality and responsibility of the various
layers that make up the protocol stack are described in turn from top-to-bottom. In
Section 3, the main procedures that run in the system within the various layers of
the stack and spanning them are described, including: the issuance of keys to hosts,
demand management, and synchronization of the quantum key pool in the service
layer, and the various key generation, routing, scheduling, and relaying functions
of the control and data planes of the network layer. In Section 4, the trust and
security models are described, and as well as options for integration with post-quantum
algorithms to attain further security robustness. Finally, in Section 5, the key lessons
learned throughout the design process are summarized, and recommendations given
for further work in this area.
41.3. Related Work
A significant focus of research in the application of QKD technology has been
to find ways of integrating it into conventional crypto-systems so as to ease the
migration. Current literature on the use of QKD-generated key material for securing
communication sessions delves into some options for integration with existing popular
security protocols. For instance, integration with IPSec and TLS is accomplished
in [3] by replacing the calculated Diffie-Hellman shared secret or the master secret,
respectively, with QKD-generated key material contained within a key database. The
protocols periodically request fresh keying material and fall back to conventional key
exchange if QKD is not operational. Another option for TLS integration is suggested
in [4], where the handshake protocol is modified so that QKD is carried out in the
middle of the handshake, and a configuration protocol is added to agree on parameters
such as the key length. Our own proposal relies upon a pre-established QKD channel
such that QKD-generated key material is continuously made available for each party,
and takes advantage of the existing pre-shared secret key standards to avoid significant
re-work in the protocols; the transmitted fields relating to the pre-shared secret are
appropriately modified so that both parties obtain the same quantum-generated key,
and significant re-work to the protocols are avoided. Proposals in the current literature
result in different trade-offs in efficiency and implementation complexity but they
address the most basic scenario of point-to-point communication only; the works do
not further show how to engineer such systems for practical use within an enterprise
environment to serve a large and dynamic host population, and to flexibly support
different key generation technologies; these themes are a key focus of our work. In
[5], the implementation of a QKD crypto-system is proposed through a secret-key
distillation protocol, which occurs in the QKD process itself. A pair of users negotiates
various quantum transmission parameters and performs on-demand key generation; it
is also noted that synchronization of the pools containing quantum key material may
be lost. The protocol, however, is again not extrapolated from a pair of users to a
network, and the synchronization logic between parties that seems necessary is not
elaborated upon.
Some work has been done to study the architecture required for securing
communications within a network scenario. In [6] and [7], a conceptual framework
is presented consisting of QKD, key management, and application layers. The
key management layer implements the standard Key Management Interoperability
Protocol (KMIP) [8]. The system relies upon a global key management service
that provides service to hosts. A key caching protocol is proposed for transferring
QKD-generated keys from the QKD layer to the key management layer. Multiple
key management servers can transfer quantum-generated keys between themselves
via Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels. The QKD-generated keys may be
transmitted from the source to the destination in a hop-by-hop manner along a
path of fully-trusted peer nodes using an encrypted transfer protocol; each pair of
nodes along the path encrypts the QKD key using existing pairwise symmetric keys.
Finally, a routing protocol is used to find the best next hop for each node. Although
the framework is useful, it lacks strategy for coping with resource constraints in the
network and dealing with the resulting limitations on the key generation rate. A
very similar high-level framework for e-governance applications is presented in [9],
where the QKD layer relies upon a cloud-hosted quantum processor [10]. In contrast,
our proposed key management service is fully decentralized to minimize bottlenecks;
5we provide a comprehensive design for issuing keys in a scalable and technology-
agnostic manner; we provide concrete implementation strategies for making best
use of the available network capacity, applying flexible security policies to serve the
encryption needs of a large user base, and for synchronizing the key generation and
issuance processes across multiple sites. In short, we have designed a QKD-based
communications system suitable for enterprise use.
Other work has explored the impact of a larger QKD system on network
engineering. A prototype European QKD network called SeCoQC (Secure Com-
munication based on Quantum Cryptography) has been proposed in [11], where
backbone nodes form a network for key distribution and provide best-effort and
guaranteed-rate services. A backbone node contains modules for key forwarding
and routing, and a load-balancing policy is enforced based on a shortest-path
calculation. A multi-layer protocol stack is also defined. We propose more extensive
routing and forwarding functions that optimize key generation in highly-dynamic
environments with constant host demand and network changes. Furthermore, we
provide a mechanism for providing different levels of security service based on the
available network capacity at any time. Finally, our session keys utilizing quantum
key material are negotiated directly between hosts to ensure scalability. In [12],
a QKD platform was proposed with an architecture consisting of application, key
supply, key management, and quantum layers. The platform was demonstrated on
the Tokyo QKD network in the context of a smartphone system. A hybrid approach
was proposed in which streaming data is encrypted with AES while the cryptographic
key is periodically refreshed from the quantum key supply. Key relay is used for key
generation across longer distances in the network. However, scalability aspects and
the flexibility of having different operating modes in the system are not specifically
addressed, while they are central to our work. In [13], a trusted authority becomes a
central node for multiplexed quantum communication; it provides hierarchical trust to
clients in a hub-and-spoke topology. This arrangement is argued to be more scalable
than general trusted QKD networks that rely upon a mesh of point-to-point links
between all communicating entities; however, each client still requires its own link to
the trusted authority. Our QKD network nodes are co-located with key management
servers that provide quantum key material to local enterprise hosts on conventional
local networks and thus require less dedicated infrastructure overall.
1.4. The Network Model
There is generally a need for a quantum-safe multi-site secure communications network
for commercial entities as well as governments. The network model being addressed,
as shown in Figure 1, is assumed to comprise multiple sites that are geographically
separated, such as buildings in a metropolitan area. Each site is a physically secure
domain that contains a Local Area Network (LAN) consisting of potentially thousands
of heterogeneous hosts, or computing devices attached to the network, including
desktop and mobile devices. Sites may be connected by fibre-optic channels with
user data multiplexed through Wavelength-Division Multiplexing (WDM), and these
are considered conventional traffic channels; the fibre is typically shared as opposed
to being dark. LANs are connected to switches, and in turn, to Wavelength Division
Multiplexers (WDMs), as shown in Figure 2. The fibre channels can be exploited
to carry both secure user traffic as well as to perform QKD; thus, they form a
quantum network consisting of quantum links between each pair of communicating
6sites. The links between sites may not necessarily consist of fibre, however. The sites
may alternatively be connected by any other channel enabling both quantum and
classical communication, notably such as a free-space optical channel; the proposed
architecture supports any such link. For the purpose of this discussion, it will be
assumed that fibre channels are being utilized.
Figure 1: The network model consists of multiple communicating sites, each containing
hosts that request session keys from their local KMS (Key Management Service). Each
KMS maintains a quantum key pool that contains QKD-generated key material. QKD is
executed over a quantum network of such sites. Once hosts obtain session keys to encrypt
individual communication sessions, they can engage in secure communication across sites
over a conventional network connection, which may exhibit a different topology.
Fibre channelSwitch
Multiplexer
Hosts
(a) Pairwise communicating sites.
Sites
Fibre-Optic 
Links
(b) Multiple communicating sites.
Figure 2: Pairwise sites typically communicate over an existing fibre-optic channel that is
accessed by respective hosts through a switch and optical multiplexer employing wavelength-
division multiplexing. Each site may be connected to more than one other site via an isolated
optical path over which QKD is being executed on a dedicated pair of QKD devices; the
collection of sites forms a quantum network.
A fundamental difficulty is that the QKD protocol is designed to work for two
parties only; however, in a metropolitan network, quantum-safe communication must
be permitted between any arbitrary hosts on any arbitrary sites; a flexible addressing
mechanism and scalability are therefore required. Additional challenges are the
distances involved; sites may be separated by tens of kilometres, limiting the key
generation rate. A metropolitan network may consist of tens of sites, and each site
may contain thousands of hosts, so that there is great contention for quantum key
material. Additionally, sites may not be fully mesh-connected by quantum links, so
7that relaying of quantum key material to remote sites is required. Finally, dedicated
quantum links through dark fibre for QKD may not be available or cost-effective, so
that existing fibre-optic lines for client traffic may need to be utilized for QKD. Each
node† in the network may have dual roles; it may act as an end-point for a connection
or as a relay for the QKD key generation process, or both.
The host of each site retrieves a session key from the locally-hosted Key
Management Service (KMS); this key encrypts a single communication session between
any two hosts located on separate sites. The same pair of users can engage in multiple
secure sessions such as chat, file transfer, and videoconferencing, each requiring its
own session key; this approach minimizes the impact of a single key compromise,
and permits different algorithms and key types to be used for different applications
as appropriate. Each KMS maintains a key repository, called a quantum key pool,
that contains key material generated through Quantum Key Distribution (QKD),
referred to here as QKD-generated key material or quantum key material. Once hosts
obtain session keys to encrypt individual communication sessions, they can engage in
secure communication across sites over a conventional network connection, including
a wireless broadband network, copper cable network, or long-haul optical fibre. The
conventional network may have a different topology than that of the quantum network,
and may include the use of routers and switches.
Other network engineering design options may be relevant to the QKD network.
It is possible to have some QKD network backbone nodes, which are not associated
with any specific sites, acting as relays only; these can improve network operation
by adding possible paths and capacities. Note that conventional network devices
cannot extend the range of the quantum channels used in QKD; transparent all-optical
switching results in attenuation [14], while conventional routers and amplifiers are
incompatible with QKD. Nevertheless, conventional passive optical switches can result
in the creation of large and flexible network topologies for the purpose of executing
QKD; this avoids sole reliance on a mesh of point-to-point links only where all nodes
must function as relays for others. The routing logic in our design is compatible with
any general approach to the topology. The scalability of the communications system
is an important consideration that must be factored into applicable areas of its design,
including processing, network, and storage capacities. As a very general example, a
large enterprise network may reasonably be expected to consist of 5 to 20 sites, within
a single major city, housing a total population of 10,000 to 20,000 hosts, with a total
of 1,000 communication requests being generated per second.
2. The Design of a Scalable and Secure Communications System
2.1. Layered Architectural Style
Overall, we have designed a system for enterprise-level sites to securely communicate
in a large metropolitan network. Key generation occurs using QKD technology over
quantum channels connecting pairs of sites with maximum utilization of available
capacity. A scalable service issues session keys from a quantum key pool, containing
QKD-generated quantum key material, to local hosts on each site. Hosts can then use
†The terms site and node may be used almost interchangeably in the discussion of the
metropolitan network; a site describes a physically secure domain housing a population of hosts
utilizing secure communication services, and this facility becomes addressable as a node in inter-site
data exchange over a conventional or quantum network.
8the session keys to securely communicate over conventional TCP/IP channels. The
key generation and distribution mechanisms are designed to scale to many sites and
hosts.
The system is composed in a layered architecture style, as shown in Figure 3; this
software engineering model ensures that the major functions are grouped separately
with well-defined interfaces across the layers that can be standardized. Traversing the
protocol stack in the bottom-up direction, the Quantum Link Layer (QLL) produces
raw key material by employing QKD hardware across a quantum link between two
sites, based on instructions received from the Quantum Network Layer (QNL) above.
The QNL issues key generation and routing requests for raw key material to be
produced through the trusted-node network, and assembles and provides it to the Key
Management Service (KMS) Layer above to fill its key pool. The KMS responds to key
requests from the Host Layer above by issuing keys from its pool of QKD-generated
key material that it manages, in accordance with a configured security policy. The
Host Layer at the top encapsulates the software applications running on host hardware
within a site, such as desktops and mobile devices, that require secure communication
with other hosts; these applications request session keys, either through a proprietary
or standard protocol.
The system optimizes key generation through a network of sites in which the
majority would be expected to function as trusted nodes; these are sites which
volunteer to act as intermediaries for other sites that do not share a direct quantum
link over which key generation through QKD could occur. A trusted node engages in
QKD with one site that is an endpoint in secure communication, and then in turn,
the other endpoint; the trusted node then provides a translation between the two keys
that it participates in generating, so that the endpoints are able to construct and
share a single key in the end. A chain of trusted nodes can be built to cover larger
geographical distances. Because each trusted node unavoidably knows the keys that
it creates, it must be fully trusted by the endpoints. Although trusted nodes are the
current state-of-the-art, there is very active research in developing practical quantum
repeaters utilizing entanglement that will replace the need for trusted nodes, and will
result in fewer compromises in the trust model.
The layered architecture results in a technology-independent design that can
accommodate any QKD technology with minimal changes. Replacing fibre-link QKD
with free-space QKD, for example, can occur just by modifying or replacing the
lowermost link layer that communicates directly with the QKD devices. One can
even design the option to use QKD in host applications irrespective of the current
availability of QKD; should the service become available in the future, then those
applications will be immediately enabled for it. This design choice can be made at
the same time as post-quantum alternatives are designed into those applications. An
implementation-level security policy can dictate which available technology to use
to satisfy business needs. Application hosts can be made to choose an appropriate
key agreement protocol such as SSL or IPSec based on engineering considerations;
issues such as compatibility, ease of configuration, support for data compression,
interoperability, and transfer speed are discussed in [15]; irrespective of the protocol
chosen, QKD will generate quantum key material at a lower layer for its use. Further
discussion on how QKD can be best combined with the use of post-quantum algorithms
is found later in section 4.4.
The following subsections examine the high-level responsibilities and functionali-
ties of each individual layer in greater detail. The layers are presented in top-to-bottom
9order, to match the general direction of the control flow within the system. Then, in
the next section, the operations of the system that enable interaction across the entire
suite of layers are detailed.
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Figure 3: The QKD communications system is composed of multiple layers. Various high-
level procedures are constantly running across the stack. In the User Service Procedure, a
host inside the Host Layer requests and is issued keys from the key pool within the Key
Management Service (KMS) Layer. In the Core Procedure, the KMS layer in turn reports
the demand for keys to the QKD Network Layer (QNL), which finds capacity in the quantum
network to perform the key generation, and determines how the key generation data flows
are to be routed through the trusted nodes. In the Base Procedure, the QNL then issues
instructions to the Quantum Link Layer (QLL) to generate raw key bits along each route by
employing QKD devices; these key bits are then passed up to the QNL, assembled as a key
bit stream shared by the endpoints, and then passed up to the key pool in the KMS. There is
a clear dependency between each pair of layers that is implemented by an interface contract.
2.2. The Host Layer
The Host Layer encompasses the end user applications engaging in secure information
exchange required by various government and industry verticals. The applications
run on a heterogenous mix of hardware including desktop computers, notebooks,
and mobile devices. In particular, this layer may be manifested in software as a
protocol stack in itself that will in its entirety act as a consumer of keys generated
by the proposed QKD system; in this respect, the proposed system is agnostic to the
security protocol used within the Host Layer. For example, one possible operating
context is a mobile application running on a smartphone that utilizes Transport Layer
Security (TLS) to open an encrypted connection to a service running on a web server
situated on another site. As will be described later, TLS provides a mechanism that
can be adapted to request keys from the proposed QKD system. TLS itself, or at
least significant components of it, may be considered to map to the presentation
layer of the OSI model (layer 6) or the application layer of the TCP/IP model; these
mappings may be open to debate, but it is of no consequence here; for the purpose of
describing the interaction of the user with the proposed QKD communications system,
10
the mobile application and its use of TLS is considered to strictly occupy the Host
Layer being defined here. The application will request QKD-generated keys from the
Key Management Service layer below. Local access by hosts to this layer through the
LAN is not restricted in the proposed solution; if warranted by the IT policy of the
organization, then access controls such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) or one
of many other controls may be additionally deployed, and may be integrated with the
security policy enforcement function in this layer. Such local access controls would rely
upon conventional, not quantum-safe, cryptographic techniques; they would strictly
provide authentication internally within a site only.
2.3. Optional Third-Party Local Key Management Service Layer
Optionally, a KMS (Key Management Service) layer, implemented by a third-party,
may reside between the Host Layer and the KMS Layer of the proposed QKD
communications system. Its existence depends on the nature of the deployment
of the proposed QKD communications system, and is not depicted in Figure 3; it
may be part of a standardized or a custom solution. This layer is responsible for
disseminating QKD-generated session keys obtained from the proposed QKD system
via some additional mechanism to local hosts on one or more sites. For instance,
the Kerberos network authentication system (the integration of which will be covered
later in Section 3.2) provides its own Key Distribution Centre (KDC) that works in
concert with a Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) to issue session keys to clients. The
TGS will obtain its session keys from the QKD system’s KMS Layer below, rather
than generating them itself; in this way, the QKD system’s functionality is abstracted
from the third-party key management service. Furthermore, the third-party KMS
may fall back to using conventional cryptography if the QKD communications system
is unavailable.
2.4. The (QKD) Key Management Service Layer
The Service Layer contains a KMS (Key Management Service) that issues QKD-
generated keys to hosts to secure new communication sessions with hosts on other
sites. The KMS reads quantum-generated key material from the network layer below,
and manages the key material in a quantum key pool. At all times, the KMS maintains
synchronization of the key pool with other sites. It constructs session keys for hosts
using an appropriate key construction strategy that is consistent with the security
policy contained in its policy engine; for instance, the policy may dictate different key
lengths and lifetimes, depending on the cryptographic algorithm to be utilized by the
host; suggestions for quantum-safe algorithms and suitable parameters are found in
[16]. The KMS will issue session keys to local hosts upon request while the quantum
key pool contains sufficient key material. A limited key lifetime will require refresh
of the key through a re-issue process similar to the original issue. As dictated by
the policy, the KMS will make an appropriate response when the key pool is nearly
exhausted; for example, it may wait for additional quantum key material to be fed by
the network layer, or re-use existing material using a key expansion technique, such
as the Rijndael key schedule [17]. The KMS consists of several functional areas that
may be decomposed into a modular software structure, as shown in Figure 4a and
described in detail in Table 1.
The KMS can issue keys to hosts using a proposed generic protocol as shown at
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The Key Management Function within the KMS in the Service Layer is
responsible for key management, and consists of the following modules:
Key Request
module
As the primary interface point for hosts, this module services
requests for session keys. It also collects and analyzes demand
statistics. When the quantum key pool is exhausted, it falls back to
key derivation if allowed by the policy, or blocks the host.
Remote KMS
Coordination
module
This module coordinates with the remote KMS over the
conventional network to start the process of key generation through
the network layer. It also terminates the process for maintenance or
error recovery.
Session Key
Assignment
module
This module assigns session keys from the quantum key pool if
sufficient bits are available.
Session Key
Generation
module
This module starts and stops the key generation process by
notifying the network layer of its local host demand, and will
suggest a key generation rate; it will also initialize the quantum key
pool size based on the projected peak demand.
The Quantum Key Pool Function is responsible for the management of the
quantum key pool, and consists of the following modules:
Key Status
module
This module keeps track of the current status of key bits as keys are
assigned to fulfill session key requests. Key bits will need to be
reserved (even after allocation to the local host) until the remote
host also retrieves the same key, and the key negotiation protocol
concludes.
Quantum Key
Database module
This module contains a copy of available QKD-generated key bits,
also referred to as quantum key bits, read from the QKD network
layer. The key bits, once populated in this database, are guaranteed
to be synchronized with the remote site.
Remote Pool
Synchronization
module
This module ensures that the key pool database on the remote site
is synchronized at all times with the local database. This module
will handle various exceptional conditions which may require
purging the database and halting the QKD process.
The Policy Engine Function is responsible for enforcing policy rules
governing key generation and use, and consists of the following modules:
Policy
Enforcement
module
This module verifies the security policy requirements on the hosts
and keys. Rules are enforced during key assignment, such as those
pertaining to key length and lifetime.
Policy Injection
module
This module allows an administrator to inject a policy into the
policy database.
Policy Database
module
This module contains all of the security policies. Different policies
may be defined for different classes of users and resources.
The external interfaces to the KMS, and the KMS modules that
communicate via these interfaces, consist of the following:
Host interface This interface accepts key requests from hosts in the Host Layer by
the Key Request module. The interface may be implemented using
an appropriate remote method invocation that is externally
accessible.
QKD Network
Layer interface
This interface reads quantum key bits from the QKD Network Layer
and stores them in the Quantum Key Database. The network layer
is typically accessed through an internal call into the immediate
layer below the current Service Layer within the protocol stack.
KMS Peer
interface
This interface is utilized by the Remote KMS Coordination module
for synchronization with the KMS on the remote site, and may be
implemented by a TCP/IP socket over a network.
Table 1: Descriptions of the high-level functions of the Service Layer.
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Host	Interface
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Quantum	
Key	Pool
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KM
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Interface	to	QKD	Link	Layer
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Figure 4: High-level functional views of the Key Management Service (KMS) Layer and
QKD Network Layer (QNL) are shown. The KMS has three main areas of responsibility:
key management, in which it constructs and issues session keys to local hosts from QKD-
generated key material; maintenance of the Quantum Key Pool, which stores the key material
that is kept synchronized with other sites, and a policy engine which enforces security policies
on key issuance. The KMS interfaces with the immediately adjacent Host Layer and QNL,
and also initializes QKD key generation with the other sites through a peer interface and
a secured conventional network channel. The QNL has two main areas of responsibility: a
control plane that schedules and manages key generation requests to other sites by finding
the optimal routes for key generation through the trusted node network; a data plane that
handles the flows of raw key data across trusted nodes, and allocates temporary key pools
before final assembly of key material for an arbitrary pair of endpoints. The QNL interfaces
with its own adjacent layers: the KMS above, through which it listens for key generation
demands and then passes up its finalized raw key material for storage in the key pool; the
QKD Link Layer below, through which it sends lower-level instructions so that QKD devices
start or stop operation.
high-level in Figure 5. To ensure scalability, minimal server state is maintained by
the KMS. The host is responsible for negotiating a secure session after retrieval of the
session key. The crucial characteristic is that for hosts Alice and Bob communicating
from separate sites, Alice’s KMS issues a session key to her; Alice then transmits
key selection information to Bob so that he may retrieve the same session key from
his own KMS. Because the quantum key pools are always in sync during the QKD
process, and the selection information is an index into the pool, the session key itself
is never actually transmitted and thus cannot be eavesdropped. Within a single site,
the KMS can be hosted as a virtualized service on a rack or blade server to achieve
scalability. The server should be physically secured so that there is no direct access
to the quantum key pool.
It is also possible to utilize a variant of this generic protocol where the local
and remote KMSs, rather than the hosts, directly interact during key agreement.
After the initial key grant to the originating host, Alice’s KMS will directly transmit
the key selection information to Bob’s KMS through the authenticated KMS peer-
to-peer interface. Although this results in slightly greater complexity in the KMS
implementation and requires limited state information on the session to be kept server-
13
side, it reduces host-to-host communication which can be costly especially in a wireless
context; furthermore, it allows both KMSs to perform host authentication, and the
remote KMS can notify the remote host of the incoming session through an efficient
push-based notification mechanism. The process of agreement of QKD-generated keys
has also been integrated with standard security protocols such as TLS; the integration
approach is discussed later in Section 3.2.
Site A
Alice KMS Policy Engine
Site BPolicy 
Engine KMS Bob
Local Session Key Request Check Policy
Policy ConstraintsLocal Session Key Grant
Remote Session Key Negotiation (Host-to-Host)
Remote Session Key RequestCheck Policy
Policy Constraints Remote Session Key Grant
Remote Session Key Confirmation
Encrypted Communication using Session Key
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 7
Alice obtains the 
quantum key from pool
Bob obtains the 
quantum key from pool
Alice sends key selection info to Bob
Figure 5: The generic protocol for key negotiation between Alice on Site A and Bob on Site B
is shown with a high-level representation of the actual message exchange. Alice requests a
session key from the local KMS in order to begin secure communication with Bob. Alice’s
local KMS enforces any relevant policies, and grants a session key to Alice with an optional
expiry time, as well as a signed packet containing key selection information. Alice then
contacts Bob directly over the conventional network and provides this packet so that Bob
can refer his own KMS to retrieve the same key; this is possible because the key pools of
both sites are synchronized with the same content. Alice and Bob can then begin secure
communication with the same symmetric session key. This key will be periodically refreshed
by the hosts if necessary through an exchange with the KMS similar to the key grant scenario;
the refresh requirements are specified by the KMS during key grant.
The KMS ensures continuous synchronization of its quantum key pool with that
of the corresponding remote site for each site-to-site connection. The key pools must
always be in sync so that the same quantum key material can be referenced and
discovered during session key negotiation conducted by the sites’ hosts. The KMS’s
coordinate securely through a communications channel that is typically a conventional
network; the connection is authenticated through a mechanism such as that which will
be described later in Section 4.2. Another possibility is to have each KMS make a
request into its respective underlying network layer, and all KMS coordination occurs
through that layer.
The KMS Layer communicates with the Network Layer below to extract the
quantum key material for storage in the quantum key pool. The KMS also initializes
and terminates the overall site-to-site connection process. The underlying network
layer is normally assumed to perform QKD key generation, but if the performance
of this process is deemed insufficient or is interrupted, then another crypto-system
can be utilized as a fall-back mechanism if allowed by the security policy. The other
crypto-system may be based on another quantum-safe, or even a classical, algorithm
and protocol, while its implementation maintains the same interface to the KMS layer.
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2.5. The QKD Network Layer
The QKD Network Layer (QNL) provides quantum key material to the local KMS
and negotiates key generation with other sites to enable inter-site communication. The
QNL can flexibly contend with any network topology; for instance, some end nodes
may not be directly connected as neighbours through a point-to-point quantum link;
such nodes could be connected via more than one hop in a given network topology
such as ring, star, or a partially meshed topology. In this case, the QNL needs to relay
the key material via trusted nodes; in so doing, the QNL effectively forms a quantum
network so that it can generate key material for any arbitrary pair of nodes.
The QNL performs network control and management of the nodes via a control
plane technology suite, while key generation is undertaken by a data plane technology
suite. The data plane activities are controlled by the control plane technologies; the
key generation activities conducted by the QKD link and physical layers are initiated,
coordinated, scheduled, and terminated by the control plane. In the context of the
data plane, data refers to the key bits generated by the QKD devices over all the
links in the network, which are independent of the end users’ application traffic data
transported in the integrated classical communication network. The QNL controls
the lower layer activities according to requests from the KMS. The QNL consists of
several functional areas that may be decomposed into a modular software structure,
as shown in Figure 4b and described in Table 2.
The control plane within the QNL establishes a path for the relay through by
issuing key generation requests through a routing function. As part of its optimization,
the routing takes into consideration the link capacities of the quantum network as well
as the demand for key generation as determined through host demand monitoring by
the KMS. The QNL establishes one or even multiple paths for key generation between
any arbitrary pair of nodes, and performs automatic reassembly in the latter case. The
QNL schedules key generation real-time in response to demand dynamics reported by
the KMS. Its routing function is able to adapt to and perform computation on a
dynamic network structure where nodes are usually fixed in place but not necessarily
so; for instance, a satellite- or aircraft-based QKD setup could serve as a travelling
node to provide temporary connectivity if a fibre link is unavailable or longer range is
required. When multiple paths are employed, the key material can be combined at the
destination site with some record-keeping overhead; for instance, the combination can
occur through an exclusive OR operation on the various key material inputs; various
options are described in [18]. If some of the multiple paths may be unreliable, then
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [19] can be employed to recover the key, but at the
cost of some overhead in the transmission of key data along the multiple paths. All
such techniques are compatible with our design.
The security policy may dictate which key forwarding tactics are allowed, and
the KMS is charged with enforcing its ruleset by informing the network layer about
any applicable policy. Such rules may be additional attributes of the defined security
classes; in this case, the classes will dictate not only how key material is to be used,
but also how it is to be generated. For instance, for higher security, the KMS can
request the sole use of a direct quantum channel with the other site, if it is available.
If forwarding along trusted nodes is allowed, then the KMS may specify whether a
single or multiple concurrent paths are to be used, and how many hops along each
path are acceptable.
The data plane within the QNL temporarily stores the key material that is relayed
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The Control Plane suite in the QKD Network Layer coordinates all of the
QNL nodes to form a QKD network and to generate raw key material
according to requests from the KMS, and consists of the following modules:
Key Generation
Messaging
Function
This function enables both neighbouring and non-neighbouring QKD
nodes to exchange key generation demands.
QKD Routing
Function
This function determines the path or multiple paths to be used for
generating keys between any pair of nodes.
QKD Scheduling
Function
This function schedules the task of relaying keys for different pairs of
QKD nodes.
The Data Plane suite in the QKD Network Layer generates raw key
material through QKD for any arbitrary pair of nodes, according to
instructions from the Control Plane, and consists of the following modules:
Key Relaying
Function
This function performs the key relaying operations for a given pair
of nodes, according to the schedule given by the QKD Scheduling
Function.
Temporary Key
Pool
Management
Function
This function manages the local key pool to supply the key bits
needed by the Key Relaying Function for other sites, as well as the
ones needed by the local site.
The external interfaces to the QNL, and the QNL modules that
communicate via these interfaces, consist of the following:
Interface to the
Service Layer
This interface provides a communication mechanism between the
KMS and the QNL, through which the two layers can exchange key
generation demand and response messages. The KMS can demand
a particular operating mode for key generation, a generation rate,
and amount of key material for particular sites, depending on the
context.
Interface to the
QKD Link Layer
This interface provides a communication mechanism between the
QNL and the QKD Link Layer (and ultimately the physical layer),
through which key generation request and response messages are
exchanged. This interface has to be extensible so that it can work
with different QKD devices, as the command interfaces of those
devices are typically vendor-dependent. In the context of the relevant
QKD ETSI Industry Specification Group (ISG) standard [20], this
interface could satisfy the ETSI QKD Application Interface API,
which is used to obtain key material for an associated key handle.
The network layer can specify Quality of Service (QoS) information
to the link layer to request a particular bit rate, based on the demand
data provided by the KMS.
Table 2: Descriptions of the high-level functions of the QKD Network Layer.
between nodes; every trusted node along the path maintains a temporary local key
pool for this purpose, as will be explained later in Section 3.6, and the QNL at the
originating end performs final assembly of the key material. Once the QNL passes up
the completed key bits to the KMS, the QNL no longer continues to store it. The
KMS will maintain the key material within its own key pool until it is issued to users.
Robustness is built into the fabric; if the QNL sees any service interruption, it notifies
the KMS which performs a retry or passes the error up the stack, as appropriate.
The QNL will ultimately optimize the key generation across the entire network so
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that throughput in the system is maximized. For users that are of higher priority, the
policy may typically dictate frequent session key refresh and perhaps even a one-time
pad for very limited use for certain users. In this case, these key generation demands
may be weighed more heavily in the optimization calculation.
2.6. The QKD Link Layer
Immediately below the QNL, the QKD Link Layer (QLL) produces raw quantum key
bits over each link by executing a QKD protocol. It establishes quantum key material
between connected node pairs and provides it to the QNL. There is a plethora of
QKD protocols and link technologies to choose from, with varying implementation
complexities, key rates, and robustness; some are mentioned in [21] and [22]. A
“quantum Internet” will likely need to integrate various quantum technologies [23].
Metropolitan-scale distances are achievable through a combination of fibre and limited
free-space links. Longer distances could be supported by quantum repeaters and
satellites, and physical routing accomplished via optical switching, whether active or
passive. Resource sharing is possible with the multiplexing of QKD and classical
signals. Ultimately, the target context will help select suitable QKD technologies.
The QLL can expose switching and addressing functionality to the QNL, so that
the QNL can configure QKD devices and their connectivity to achieve an effective
setup for the routing of key generation. However, only the QLL has direct access
to the quantum link; any instructions issued from the QNL must traverse through
the QLL layer. The QLL can make use of dedicated infrastructure as well as shared
resources to carry out the key generation. The QLL also informs the QNL of its
current rate as well as its practical limits, and additional constraints, so that the link
capacity can be understood; for example, there may be a predicted temporal window
of opportunity for key generation via free-space transmission.
3. High-Level Procedures in the Communications System
A number of critical procedures are always executing in the QKD communications
system, some of which will result in interactions spanning multiple layers in the
proposed software architecture. The procedures are described at high-level in the
following subsections.
3.1. Session Key Issuance Within the Host Layer
A generic protocol to initiate and conduct secure communication between computing
hosts, based on the use of quantum-generated encryption keys, is described. The
protocol is host-based; it provides full control of the communication session to the
hosts. Although this particular protocol is formulated from scratch and requires
custom implementation work, it is instructive in its unique approach to session key
agreement based on the use of QKD. Direct integrations of similar mechanisms with
existing standardized transport protocols such as TLS have also been investigated.
For brevity, the generic protocol will be examined at this point: suppose that Alice,
the originating host on Site A, wishes to initiate a secure communication session with
Bob, a host on remote Site B, and requires confidentiality of user data transmitted
over the network. Alice and Bob may each communicate with their respective
local KMS via their LAN network or a separate encrypted channel. Prior to the
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session initiation, or alternatively as a direct result of it, Sites A and B will have
engaged in the QKD protocol so that they will share a pool of key material. In
this protocol, the hosts are responsible for completing the key negotiation protocol
sequence by communicating with their respective KMS’s, and between the hosts
themselves. As multiple communication sessions may be initiated between each pair
of hosts in the metropolitan network, each session will be identified by a globally
unique session identifier. The pair will initially require mutual authentication prior to
key negotiation, which may be accomplished through the use of a pre-shared secret
or public key signatures (that are not quantum-safe but are used only in the short-
term, and issued by a certificate authority) [16]. Alice commences by requesting a new
session key from her KMS. Alice identifies that the remote host resides on the remote
site B through a Domain Name System (DNS) or similar query. Alice assigns a globally
unique session ID to the new communication session being initiated. Alice’s KMS
constructs a new session key by obtaining quantum key material from the quantum
key pool, if it is not already immediately available for assignment. Alice’s KMS must
enforce any security policies that are defined. Alice’s KMS obtains advice from the
policy engine based on a previously injected policy and the identities of the parties
involved. The policy engine returns pertinent parameters enforced by the policy, such
as the minimum key length and maximum allowed session key lifetime.
The KMS provides a symmetric session key to Alice constructed from the material
in the quantum key pool; the key may be a block cipher key. Alice caches it for use
in secure communication with Bob for the duration of the session and no longer than
its required lifetime. The KMS also provides an associated key selection information
packet sufficient for the remote host to obtain the same key on the remote site. This
packet is encrypted using an existing inter-site symmetric key to secure communication
between the pair of KMS’s on separate sites. The KMS also provides a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) for the packet to detect and prevent tampering. Alice
then provides the packet to Bob so that he can recover the same session key from
his own KMS. Bob’s KMS verifies what constraints must be enforced on session key
generation and management, based on an injected policy and the parameters specified
by the requesting host; modification or re-negotiation of some parameters may occur.
Bob then sends back a confirmation to Alice, and secure communication between the
two hosts can then begin.
During construction of the session keys from the quantum key material in the
pool, it is possible for a race condition to occur as a result of the possibility of
multiple hosts simultaneously initiating communication sessions, and thus session key
requests, at each site. The likelihood of this occurrence increases with the size of the
host population and the frequency of their communication with hosts on external sites.
For instance, Alice may initiate a session request and be granted a session key from her
KMS. Before Alice sends a session negotiation message to Bob with the key selection
information, another user Charlie on the remote site B may engage his KMS. Charlie
may make a similar session key request and be granted the same session key on his
end that Alice intended for Bob. In this case, Bob’s KMS will report an error to Bob
which will get relayed back to Alice and result in the session key request having to be
re-tried with a new key. In a highly scalable system, such race conditions may occur
at significant frequency and result in unnecessary and frustrating delays for users. To
reduce the impact of round-trip error handling, an appropriate key allocation strategy
may be utilized that lessens the chance of race conditions occurring. For instance,
although the quantum key pools between sites A and B are synchronized, Alice’s
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KMS can start consuming key material from the beginning of the pool, and Bob’s
KMS can start consuming it from the end. However, an effort should be made to
reduce fragmentation of the key pool, since new key material will be generated in the
same memory or disk region from which it is consumed; such fragmentation could lead
to wasted space. A possible tactic to mitigate fragmentation is to designate a small
portion of the quantum key pool as a working set, and have each KMS consume key
material from a different end within this working set only.
Care should be exercised when independently issuing copies of key material
produced by QKD to multiple parties across sites to avoid security issues. For example,
if Alice is issued a session key that Charlie (as a third-party) obtains on the remote
site for an unrelated session rather than Bob (Alice’s intended recipient), then none
of these parties must be allowed to proceed with the use of the keys and risk the
possibility of Alice and Charlie reading each other’s communication. The KMS must
deny a host from using key selection information to retrieve a key previously issued
on the same site; furthermore, a host being granted a key must receive confirmation
from the remote host that the same key was successfully retrieved, before the key
in question is used to encrypt user communication. There are ways to enforce this
problem beyond host protocol rules, such as fully synchronizing the KMS’s on each
key issuance and updating their key pool status, or by maintaining separate key pools
for each host at each site; however, these techniques carry overhead and scalability
may be adversely affected. Another approach may be to use a token system: when
Alice requests a key, she obtains a token, not the key itself yet. The token is then
sent to Bob to retrieve the actual key on his end. Upon confirmation of this, Alice
can then use the token to get her own copy of the key. In this way, the keys are not
immediately issued by the KMS’s until there is assurance of no race condition being
present, whether intentional or not. Ultimately, this issue must be accepted, with
hosts being trusted to obey the protocol, or a suitable solution must be devised.
3.2. Integration with Standard Security Protocols Within the Host and Third-Party
Local KMS Layers
In addition to defining generic protocols, the process of agreement of QKD-generated
keys has been integrated by using the pre-shared key cipher-suites of TLS (Transport
Layer Security) [24, 25], IPSec [26], and Kerberos [27], where the key selection
information is transmitted using supported fields. Generically, pre-shared key is a
secret that was previously shared over a secure channel; in this case, QKD-generated
key material becomes a pre-shared key that enables a security protocol and may
even be an input to further key generation algorithms. The integration with the
standard cipher-suites requires minimal changes to the client implementation and
avoids additional complexity, which is enemy to practical security engineering as
explained in [28]. The use of QKD key material results in a quantum-safe handshake
and key agreement; an appropriate cryptographic suite and key length are then
negotiated to provide quantum-safe computational security for encrypted user data.
Information-theoretic security through a one-time-pad is not directly available in
standard deployments unless a custom cipher suite is made available that consumes
quantum key material to encrypt user data bit-by-bit in a one-time pad manner. The
high-level approaches to the integrations are as follows:
• In the case of TLS, security is provided at the transport layer. The pre-shared key
(PSK) identity hint field can be re-purposed to contain the quantum key selection
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information encoded as a string of numeric characters, and encrypted by an inter-
site key. It will be transmitted in the client key exchange message between the
originating and the remote hosts, and supplied to the respective KMS’s in key
grant messages, in order for the two hosts to retrieve the final session key. To
provide computational security while being considered quantum-safe, when using
a QKD-generated key as the pre-shared key, AES-256 can be used for encryption
and HMAC-SHA384 for message integrity and authentication [16].
• In the IPSec protocol suite, the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv1) protocol is used
to set up a security association (SA) to provide security at the IP packet layer. In
the less-verbose Aggressive Mode, the key selection information can be supplied
in the identification payload between the initiator and the responder hosts; this is
in contrast to the original purpose of the payload being to create a Diffie-Hellman
shared secret which would not be quantum-safe [16]. This PSK is typically used
for mutual authentication in the first phase of the protocol in order to set up a
secure channel for key exchange. The authentication key, or the shared master
secret, is derived from the PSK through IPSec’s key construction strategy. In later
phases, the IPSec tunnel is established and encryption keys may be generated.
• Finally, Kerberos provides a mechanism for mutual authentication of a client and
server located on different domains. Each party retrieves the same session key
from their respective Ticket-Granting Service (TGS), which is derived from key
material generated through QKD between these local and remote services. The
key selection information can be specified in the service ticket issued by the local
TGS and provided in encrypted form to the remote server (located on another
site); from it, the remote TGS will then provide the final session key to the remote
server to encrypt user communication. Kerberos is widely used to provide Single-
Sign On (SSO) functionality by having the client provide service tickets, that
confirm the client’s identity, to various sites without the necessity of re-entering
credentials. With the described integration of QKD, each service ticket could
contain a reference to a different session key from the quantum key pool accessed
by the TGS, so that each client-server communication is protected.
The integration of each protocol provides a different but secure avenue through
which the quantum key selection information is provided as a pre-shared secret to both
parties, and then used to construct an encryption key to provide confidentiality for
the exchange of user data, or to provide an authentication function, depending on the
context; all of this is accomplished without significant modification to the protocol.
In the case of the TLS and IPSec protocols, which are essentially consumers of the
QKD-generated key material, their client implementations are assumed to occupy the
Host Layer in the architecture of the proposed QKD system. In the case of Kerberos,
client logic may exist within the Host Layer, while components such as the TGS
would be expected to lie within an additional Third-Party Local KMS Layer. In all
cases, the next layer down is the KMS Layer of the QKD system, which supplies the
QKD-generated session keys to be used by the protocols.
Adapting to multiple standard protocols is useful, as although they are highly
versatile and complex, they are generally used for different purposes. IPSec is
embedded within the Internet Protocol (IP) stack and is typically used to create
secure Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) that operate at the network layer of the
TCP/IP model, so it protects all upper-layer transports so that remote hosts function
as if they were directly attached to the local network; however, it requires specialized
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client software and supporting network devices. TLS functions above the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) layer, can be utilized by lightweight clients, and is supported
by all browsers for use in e-commerce; it is used for server-side authentication through
certificates and provides remote access, fine-grained access controls, and end-to-end
data encryption for applications. The Kerberos protocol is generally used for mutual
authentication of a client and server through a third-party with the use of passwords; it
enforces user access rights to multiple services and permits single-sign on, as described
above; however, the Kerberos server can be a single point of failure.
3.3. Demand Monitoring and Key Generation Requests Within the Service Layer
When requesting initiation of QKD key generation by the QNL, the KMS specifies
one of the following types of key generation to conduct:
(i) Continuous key generation at a particular rate with a given remote site. Key
material is generated while the key pool has capacity remaining. Once it fills
up, key generation can be temporarily suspended, or existing content in the pool
can be overwritten. The KMS may simply request the maximum rate supported
by the current QKD equipment and infrastructure that are installed; these are
reported to the QNL by the link layer.
(ii) A one-time demand for generating key bits of a specified amount for a given
remote site. This may occur when a client requests a new session key for the
first communication with a remote site since the last time that the QKD process
ran, and the pool is otherwise empty. The quantity of key material to generate
is based on the expected demand and may be periodically adjusted. It should be
limited by the size of the database that has been allocated for the pool.
The KMS will request key generation according to the current operating context.
The various heuristics that will affect this choice, particularly for the continuous
generation mode, include the following:
• The expected steady-state demand for key material will dictate the continuous
key generation rate; the demand is based on the expected number of hosts at a
site, and the expected frequency at which they will request new communication
sessions at particular times. In turn, based on the resulting required rate of
session key assignment and key sizes involved, the key generation rate can be
estimated. The frequency can be estimated based on historical traffic patterns
such as host arrival rates.
• The expected peak demand for key material at regular or irregular times can
determine the amount of key material that needs to be cached by the KMS. The
ability to satisfy peak demand can be accomplished by specifying a statically-
allocated key pool database that is sufficiently large, or by allowing it to grow to
a sufficiently large size. Once the database is exhausted during the peak period,
hosts will have to wait for new key material to be generated.
• The key assignment strategy will also determine the key generation rate. The
quantum key material may be used to construct session keys or it may be used
as a one-time pad, as dictated by the security policy in place. The key size to
employ will also be specified in the policy. In the case of session keys, one key
will be assigned for one entire communication session, and the key generation
rate will set based on the number of hosts and the number of sessions that they
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initiate. In the case of a one-time pad, one bit of key material will be consumed
for every bit of user data, so the rate will be set based on the total amount of
data to be transmitted by a site. The highest security level will typically require
the implementation of a one-time pad.
• The frequency at which session key material needs to be refreshed will affect the
demand and thus the key generation rate for the same expected number of hosts.
The frequency of key refresh is specified by the security policy. Key refresh may
only be required at higher security levels.
• The economical costs of the network channels used to conduct the QKD protocol
may limit the key generation rate that is employed in practice. Likewise, the
infrastructure utilized for QKD will impose a practical upper bound on the rate.
If the costs limit the key generation rate to a level that cannot meet the expected
demand, the security policy may need to be sufficiently relaxed to allow the re-use
of key material; this may be manifested by key derivation algorithms.
The key generation rate may be dynamically adjusted by a KMS while QKD
is in operation. The request for key material from the KMS may be impossible to
completely fulfill by the QKD Network Layer. The physical limitations of the QKD
hardware and supporting infrastructure that are installed will impose an upper bound
on the key generation rate that can be implemented. Limitations will apply as a result
of the kind of technology employed, the network infrastructure in use, and the physical
length of the quantum channel between sites. As only the QNL has knowledge of the
underlying infrastructure, it will limit the KMS requests as appropriate based on the
QKD link capacities reported up from the QKD Link Layer.
The KMS may alternate between the two operating modes to best serve its
local host demand for session keys, which it is constantly monitoring through various
heuristics. The quantum key pool that it maintains can serve as a cache for a surge
in traffic. Once the pool is depleted, the KMS can request on-demand key generation
by the QNL. On the other hand, if there is a constant level of demand, the KMS can
request continuous key generation. A hybrid operating mode is also possible, where
a certain rate of key generation occurs in continuous mode, and reserve capacity is
left for occasional use in the on-demand mode; this strategy may be appropriate if
utilization of existing quantum links carries a cost, such as on shared fibre-optic lines.
The proposed design is flexible enough to allow the operator or owner of the integrated
system to pursue and achieve different business goals.
Multiple security classes of connections may be defined within the security policy
managed by the policy engine, which specify how the quantum key material is to be
utilized to provide data encryption. The levels are shown in Table 3.
3.4. Quantum Key Pool Management Within the Service Layer
The quantum (QKD-generated) key bits occupying the quantum key pool undergo a
series of state transitions during normal operation of the system, as show in Figure 6.
When the key pool is initialized, quantum key material is read from the quantum
network layer and injected into the key pool; this is effectively a copy to a permanent
store. When a local host makes a request for a new session key in the context of a local
session key grant, a subset of the bits is assigned as a session key, and reserved. When
the remote host is contacted and obtains key selection information and retrieves the
same key material on the remote site, in the context of a remote session key grant, the
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Security
Class
Strategy
5
(highest)
The quantum key material will be utilized as a one-time pad. The same
amount of key material is required as the size of the message being
encrypted; this use will consume the quantum key material at the highest
rate.
4
(default)
The quantum key material will be utilized to generate session key
material. Each new secure connection initiated by a host to a remote host
will be assigned a new single session key. The session key will expire after
a specified interval, and will need to be refreshed.
3 As in class 4, but no key refresh occurs.
2 As in class 3, but if insufficient new quantum key material is currently
available, then key extension will occur to generate a session key from the
current material. A suitable key expansion technique may also be
utilized, such as the Rijndael key schedule in AES [17]. This scenario
may occur in a highly scalable application, where the number of users
engaging in simultaneous communication with other sites may exceed the
maximum quantum key generation rate that may be attained given
hardware and infrastructure limitations.
1 The quantum key material is used to generate a host-specific key that is
used for all communication sessions that the host engages in.
0
(lowest)
Insufficient quantum material exists to provide a key, or QKD key
generation is not functioning for some reason. A classical key generation
mechanism will be utilized, instead, to produce a session key; the
mechanism must be quantum-resistant, if possible, and key refresh should
occur. This class may be utilized if the QKD protocol cannot be
currently operated, or if the key generation rate cannot keep up with the
current demand for key material and hosts cannot be delayed.
Table 3: Descriptions of the various classes of security levels in the security policy.
key bits are immediately purged on confirmation of the key grant. The key bits are
then replenished with new ones as a result of the QKD key generation process. Note
that the key material cannot be deleted from the originating site until it is assigned
on the remote site; the reason is that the contents of both quantum key pools must be
exactly the same at all times; this guarantees that the remote host is able to obtain the
same session key as the local host through a remote session key grant. This principle
also applies to the state associated with each key bit.
Normally, quantum key pool bits that are available for assignment are preserved
until the assignment occurs. Once the quantum key pool becomes full, then no new
key bits are read. However, if the QKD process is operating in the continuous mode,
then it is also possible for the available bits to be overwritten with new ones. It is
also possible that once the pool becomes full, then additional space may be allocated
to increase the size of the pool in order to contain more key material. The remote
site must be informed that it needs to allocate more space, too. Note that special
conditions can occur, such as: a system shutdown (due to an error or disaster or
planned maintenance outage), interruption of the QKD process, or unexpected loss
of synchronization of quantum key pool content. These conditions will cause the
key pool contents to be purged immediately. The QKD protocol can be restarted
once the system returns to a normal state. Backup and restore functions can reduce
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Figure 6: A state diagram shows the functional states of the Quantum Key Pool contained
within the KMS and the possible transitions between them. QKD-generated key bits are
assigned from the quantum key pool during key grant to a local host, and then reserved until
the same bits are retrieved by the remote host, so that the same bits cannot be assigned to
more than one host. If the key bits that the remote host tries to retrieve have already been
assigned to some other host, due to a race condition, then an error is reported and the entire
process must be restarted.
the recovery time if a secure backup store exists. Synchronization of the key pools
belonging to a pair of sites occurs through direct communication of the respective
KMS layers through the KMS peer interface.
The key pools on both sides of a quantum network connection must match in
content so that the same quantum key material can be referenced and discovered
during session key negotiation conducted by the site hosts. If content synchronization
is lost for any reason, then the key pools will be purged, and new quantum key material
will be generated to regain a known good state. A policy may enforce the expiration
of the pool content after some time has elapsed or a threshold number of session keys
have been assigned, which will also lead to key re-generation. Such re-generation may
be automatic or will occur as the result of normal operation of the QKD protocol.
3.5. Key Generation, Routing, and Scheduling Within the Control Plane of the
Network Layer
The Key Generation Messaging Function (KGMF) in the QKD Network Layer enables
both neighbouring and non-neighbouring QKD nodes to exchange key generation
demands. The local KGMF software module within the QNL receives key generation
requests from the KMS with either a continuous or one-time demand operating mode
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specified. Consequently, the KGMF will form a Key Generation Message (KGM).
For continuous key generation, this message will be broadcasted to the whole trusted
network so that every node in the QNL formulates the same map of global demand,
which is critical to ensure the correct operation of the routing function. The KGM
will be routed over a transport available to the QNL, such as a hop-by-hop TCP
connection. The messages over a given TCP connection will be encrypted by utilizing
a site-to-site key.
For on-demand key generation, the KGMF will pass the information of the remote
site and the length of the key requested to the scheduling function, which will place
this task in the appropriate queue for scheduling. Occasionally, the KGMF may also
receive from the KMS a command terminating the key generation for a remote node.
This command will trigger the KGMF to broadcast a stop message to the whole
network; every node receiving it will update its copy of the global demand matrix,
and will trigger the QKD Routing Function (QRF) to take action accordingly. The
QRF determines the path or paths to be used for generating a certain amount of, or
a sustained rate of, key bits between any given pair of nodes.
The QRF has an initialization phase and a normal working phase. In the
initialization phase, each node needs to collect the following two inputs:
(i) From the lower-layer QLL, the key generation capacities over all quantum links
in the network, and the identities of the neighbouring nodes associated with the
links.
(ii) From the upper-layer KMS Layer, the key generation demands, which depend on
the system operation mode. If the system is operating in continuous mode, a node
collects key generation demands between itself and each of the other reachable
remote nodes in the network, as well as those of each and every pair of other
nodes. An intermediary relay node will record the requested key generation rate
for the source and the destination node pair in each and every KGM that it routes.
If the system is operating in on-demand mode, the QRF collects key generation
demands locally only.
Each node employs the principle of link-state routing [29] to determine the
best key generation paths in the network. Each node exchanges custom Link-State
Advertisements (LSAs) with all of its neighbouring nodes, adapted from those found
in the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) TCP/IP Internet routing protocol that
uses a Link State Routing (LSR) algorithm [30]. An LSA communicates a node’s
local routing topology to all other local nodes in the same area by flooding. An
advertisement packet includes the identity of the node itself, the identities of all the
other nodes to which it is directly connected, and the associated link capacities in terms
of the key generation rate; it also includes a sequence number that is necessary for the
recipients to keep track of the latest information on the link status. Each node, after
receiving an LSA with a newer sequence number, incrementally constructs a graph of
the connectivity to the network; after receiving a complete set of LSAs, it will be able
to compute the whole network topology. From it, the node can then independently
calculate the current best logical path for key generation to every possible endpoint
in the network. Each collection of best paths will be used to produce the node’s
local routing table by employing a scheme such as shortest-path or least-cost-routing
computation.
In the normal working phase, the QRF’s main tasks are determined by the
operating mode of the system:
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• In the continuous mode, the QRF solves the problem of maximizing the key
generation workloads, referred to as flows, within the network; it strives to
maximize the overall proportion of requested demand that it can satisfy along
all paths, such that each flow is bounded by the capacity of the quantum link.
After the solution has been obtained, the QRF will then know the key generation
workload for any QKD link; this information will be passed on to the scheduling
algorithm.
• In the on-demand mode, the QRF finds the route from the source node to the
destination node for a given demand. Consulting the routing table produced in
the continuous mode of operation (and updated when the topology changes), if it
exists, each node can route all the key generation messages received. Occasionally,
the QRF will need to update the network topology and recalculate the workloads.
This will be triggered by events such as node or link failures, which can be reflected
in new LSAs from directly-affected neighbouring nodes.
The routing capability of the QNL takes into consideration the residual capacity
of all the QKD links within the whole network. In link state routing, each node
can independently calculate a new route in case of a node or link failure. All nodes
need to have a highly-consistent or synchronized view of the topology; this is feasible
because the number of sites in the network is relatively small, topology changes due to
planned new nodes joining or existing nodes leaving the network are infrequent, and
the sites of the integrated network should be designed to operate with high reliability;
such changes will be made known to all the nodes in the network rapidly via the
”distributing maps” stage of the link-state routing protocol [31]. All nodes must have
the capability of detecting changes in the connectivity between themselves and their
neighbours; there are at least two ways to achieve this: firstly, the underlying QLL
will send error indication messages to the QNL if it detects any error at the link layer
that changes the capacity of the link; secondly, changes can be indicated in the “hello”
messages exchanged between neighbours [31]. If all retries fail, then an updated LSA
will be sent out to announce the new topology to other nodes in the network.
In the continuous mode of operation, the demands are expressed in terms of
key generation rates for source-destination pairs. The problem can be formulated
mathematically as a Maximum Concurrent Multi-Commodity Flow Problem (MCFP)
[32]; such a problem may be solved using a fast approximation algorithm such as the
one proposed in [33]. The organization that runs the network can learn from the
operational history and gradually adjust the demands to achieve a trade-off between
maximizing the utilization of the network and the unbalanced demands of different
source-destination pairs. Another way to deal with the problem is to formulate it as
a Maximum Multi-Commodity Flow Problem, where the objective is to maximize the
total amount of flows through the network or to maximize the network utilization,
as in [34]. The solution is an important input to both the control and data planes.
Special treatment can be applied to higher priority demands within source-destination
node pairs; one way to cater to such a need is to pre-allocate QKD capacities along
chosen paths for such pairs in the network, and subtract these capacities before solving
for the general capacity problem.
The QKD Scheduling Function (QSF) is responsible for scheduling the tasks of
relaying QKD key bits for different pairs of QKD nodes. The output of the scheduling
algorithm in the QSF is a sequence of work tickets on a per-link basis. When a
local node has more than one immediate neighbouring node, the algorithm handles all
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workloads over each individual link independently.
When the system is operating in the continuous mode, the QSF inputs the
workload assignments from the QRF. It then schedules the tasks for any given link
following a deficit-weighted round-robin algorithm [35]. When the system is operating
in the on-demand mode, the scheduling algorithm will follow a simple First-In-First-
Out (FIFO) queuing mechanism. That is, all the flows over one outgoing link will
be put in a single queue for that link, and will be served according to their arrival
sequence.
3.6. Key Relaying Within the Data Plane of the Network Layer
The Key Relaying Function (KRF) is responsible for conducting QKD key generation
within the network of quantum links. It generates and relays key bits across trusted
nodes in a mechanism like that described in [36]. The KRF processes the flows over any
given quantum link as scheduled by the QSA based on the flow assignment dictated
by the QRF. As a prerequisite, all links along a path connecting source-destination
endpoints must have established their own key pools for secure communication between
the neighbouring nodes. Referring to Figure 7, suppose that node A is the source node
and node B is the immediate downstream neighbour in the chosen path to destination
node E. Node B will select bits from its local key pool shared with A as the key K
to be eventually passed to node E. Node B encrypts the key K using a one-time pad
(OTP) with shared key bits between itself and the next downstream node C. Node B
forwards the encrypted key to node C, and so on, until the destination node E is
reached.
The KRF at each node performs the relaying activity following the work ticket
output from the scheduling algorithm in the QSF. For each ticket, the KRF retrieves
the corresponding decrypted key material from the local temporary key pool. If
the destination is the local node to which it is attached, it passes the key material
up to the KMS. Otherwise, the KRF retrieves temporary key bits of length equal
to that indicated in the ticket, which were previously generated through the QKD
protocol. The KRF then performs the OTP operation (possibly by combining through
an exclusive-OR the temporary key bits with the to-be-relayed key material) and
sends the result to a neighbouring site. The transport channel over which these key
relaying events occur is dedicated for the data plane traffic of the QKD network. This
persistent connection between neighbouring nodes can be realized through a classical
communication channel between neighbouring QKD devices and accessed at the QLL
level; it may be authenticated by using a site-to-site authentication key.
Improvements in the design of the QKD network topology can yield greater
performance in key generation; for instance, backbone nodes can provide access
to a higher-capacity sub-network. Such high-capacity data plane channels can be
incorporated into the workload assignment problems.
The Temporary Key Pool Management (TKPM) function temporarily stores and
manages key material at the QNL layer so that the Key Relaying Function can make
use of raw key material as the input into the one-time pad for key encryption. The
raw key material generated falls into three categories, which are allocated separate
buffers within the temporary key pool:
(i) The key bits that will be used by the host traffic between the local site and a
directly-connected remote site.
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Figure 7: A possible mechanism for key generation and relay across a trusted node network is
illustrated. Suppose that a host on site A wants to establish a secure communication session
with a host on another site E. The two parties need to establish a shared key K as their
session key. As the two sites are not directly connected via a quantum link, the Quantum
Network Layer (QNL) will find a path from A to E that traverses over trusted nodes B to D.
In the first step 0, part of the initialization process, A and B will establish a key stream KAB
over their quantum link using QKD, and then in step 1, B will select a subset of this stream
as the session key K to be used by endpoints A and E. In step 2, B and C will establish a
key stream K(BC), and so on in the following steps for each pair of trusted nodes until E
is reached. The session key K will be ferried across the chain of nodes by being encrypted
by the additional key streams and transmitted over a conventional network between each
pair of trusted nodes; for instance, re-visiting step 2, after establishing K(BC), B will send
the session key K to C such that it is encrypted with the keystream K(BC), serving as a
one-time-pad, as denoted by EBC(K). After C receives the encrypted key, the key stream
K(BC) is discarded. Thus, each node in succession decrypts the session key and forwards
it on to the next node in secure fashion until the endpoint is reached, and all key streams
used for the encryption will be deleted, as the one-time-pad forbids re-use. At the end of the
process, nodes A and E will share the same session key K and use it to secure communication
between themselves.
(ii) The key bits that will be used by relaying the keys to be used for host traffic
between the local site and a remote site via one or more intermediary nodes.
(iii) The key bits that will be used by relaying the keys for other node pairs that are
using the local site as an intermediary node.
The TKPM also manages the temporary storage of the keys being relayed by the
local node, which is used by the Key Relaying Function. Figure 8 shows the different
categories of key bits being managed by the TKPM for various possible links.
4. Trust and Security in the Communications System
4.1. Network Trust Model
The KMS is entrusted by all hosts within each site to aid in securing host
communication. In particular, the KMS will generate, manage, and distribute
symmetric private key information used to encrypt host communication. While the
KMS is able to decrypt host communication, hosts will not share their communication
content directly with the KMS.
Any intermediate trusted nodes that may be used to conduct the key generation
and relay processes may have sufficient knowledge of the quantum-based key material
to construct decryption keys and access user communication. In fact, the key relay
protocol requires decryption and re-encryption of key material at each intermediate
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Figure 8: Quantum key material buffers, also called temporary key pools, are allocated for
each site to fulfill the temporary key pool management responsibility of the data plane in the
Quantum Network Layer. Various buffers are required for the various categories of key bits
that are generated. Refer first to Figure 7 for an explanation of how key generation occurs
via trusted nodes. Now refer to the example node connection graph illustrated here: between
two nodes that share a direct quantum link (such as A-to-N , where the endpoints for secure
communication are A and N), the raw key bits output from execution of the QKD protocol
are immediately provided to the key pool in the KMS Layer above. If A is an endpoint node
without a direct quantum link to the other endpoint (such as A-to-Z), then A must trust
other nodes (N and X in this case) to form a relay, so it allocates a temporary buffer for the
key stream with adjacent node N from which the session key is extracted. If A is a trusted
node intermediary between two other endpoints (such as B-to-Z), then it will keep a buffer
for the key streams established through QKD with its immediately adjacent nodes (B and
N), which are used in the encryption of the session key being transported to the remote
endpoint Z. Buffers will also be maintained for session keys that are being relayed. For
instance, if A is an endpoint (such as in A-to-Z), it will pass session keys that are relayed to
it from the remote endpoint Z up to the KMS; A will also maintain a temporary buffer for
a session key that it decrypts and then re-encrypts as part of the relay to other endpoints.
Raw quantum key material is discarded once the relay function is fulfilled, and the material
is passed up to the KMS Layer as required, to reclaim storage and minimize risk.
hop. Thus, trusted nodes participating in the QKD process must be fully trusted
by both origin and destination sites. An alternative would be to employ multiple
paths for the relaying of quantum key material between the source and destination
sites and through the trusted node network. As long as the nodes along at least
one path are not successfully compromised by an attacker, then the security of the
key material is kept intact. An attack could be mounted by an active adversary or
simply by having the trusted nodes function in an honest-but-curious manner such
that they occasionally eavesdrop. If all the key bits generated from multiple paths are
combined to construct the final key, then single nodes along different paths will have
access to just subsets of the entire key material, while the source and destination sites
have access to all of it. A successful attack on one path will not compromise the key
material generated on another path. However, the overall effective key length may be
reduced in proportion to the subset of key material that a single node, compromised
by an attack, is forwarding along its own path. To maintain the same effective key
length, the use of multiple paths will require an increase in the transmission of key
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bits (e.g. a doubling of keys bits when using a pair of key relaying paths, compared
to a single path).
4.2. Authentication of Sites
Sites engaging in secure communication, for instance to exchange control messaging
traffic, must be authenticated so that they can trust each other in multiple scenarios
and across multiple layers of the communications stack. For instance, sites must
communicate with each other securely at the KMS layer in order to coordinate the
start and termination of the QKD protocol in the network layer below. They must
also communicate at the network layer in order to relay the quantum key material over
intermediate hops. In all cases, one or more TCP channels may be typically utilized;
because the channels may be public, confidentiality and authentication is required
through the use of an inter-site, or site-to-site, key; one of the following means may be
used as the basis for the key, with the first option being simplest in the early stages of
QKD networks, but other alternatives may be used instead as the networks become
more sophisticated:
(i) A pre-shared key is utilized. The first instance of this key is generated through
some means other than QKD (which is not yet executing), and then disseminated
through a secure out-of-band channel. It is then re-assigned during initial
operation of the QKD hardware, using QKD-generated key bits. For instance, it
may comprise the sequence of bits found in a reserved area of the quantum key
pool, once those bits are generated, and then refreshed regularly with new key
bits.
(ii) Short-term public cryptography is utilized as a boot-strap to initially authenticate
a new site-to-site channel. Later, once QKD is operational and a secure quantum
channel exists, a pre-shared key is constructed from quantum key material to
replace the public cryptographic key.
(iii) Post-quantum cryptography, in the form of public-key algorithms that are
considered secure against attack by quantum computers, may be utilized to boot-
strap authentication in a fashion similar to the previous option; a public-key
infrastructure or a system such as Kerberos may be required.
Sites must also communicate at the link layer over a classical channel to carry
out the discussion required in the QKD protocol. The above approaches may be
used to ensure unconditionally secure authentication of this channel. Note that these
options only apply to the initial authentication, and encryption if appropriate, of
a new communications channel between sites at the appropriate layer; they do not
apply to host communication, which relies on QKD operation and the issuance of
QKD-generated key material through a key establishment protocol as described in
section 2.4, in order to conduct symmetric key encryption of user data.
4.3. Security of the System
The design of the KMS assumes the satisfaction of certain security properties,
including the following:
(i) The encoding and decoding devices within the network layer are physically secure
from attack.
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(ii) The conventional channel used for coordination of the QKD protocol between
parties may be read by an eavesdropper. However, an attacker cannot modify
the contents of it or inject unauthorized contents into it without being detected.
Thus, the conventional network channel must be authenticated, and there is a
feasible method of doing so.
(iii) Once a quantum computer capable of mounting a successful attack against the
security of a protocol such as TLS exists, any random number generator that
is employed must be truly random. A Quantum Random Number Generator
(QRNG) may be used for the purpose of generating a random nonce to prevent
a replay attack during key negotiation in such protocols as TLS. Otherwise, a
pseudo-random number generator may suffice.
The proposed host-based protocol described in Section 3.1 provides confidentiality
of user data by encrypting it using the symmetric session key, once it is successfully
negotiated and secure communication has begun between hosts of separate sites. The
only relevant traffic transmitted over the conventional network prior to the secure
communication is the remote session key negotiation message sent from the originator
to the recipient, and the remote session confirmation reply-back. An attacker Eve
will be unable to mount a successful man-in-the-middle attack. If Eve intercepts the
remote session key negotiation message from Alice to Bob, then the encrypted key
selection packet cannot be read, as it is encrypted with an inter-site key. Eve cannot
successfully replay this message to Bob, since authenticated encryption is utilized.
The key negotiation message should be protected by an authentication tag such as
a Message Authentication Code (MAC) as part of a method such as encrypt-then-
MAC. This method ensures that Bob will only read valid messages from Alice, and it
makes them unforgeable under chosen-ciphertext attack (where Eve chooses to decrypt
known ciphertexts and recover the key from the resulting plaintexts). The MAC can
be applied using additional key material from the quantum key pool, which may be
retrieved at the same time as the key material intended for the host-to-host session
key itself. Encrypt-then-MAC has been prescribed for TLS [37].
The session key is changed at regular intervals with the assumption that it will
increase security. If a session key is successfully defeated, then only the communication
encrypted with that session key will be unlocked; the protocol thus achieves perfect
forward secrecy, as the session keys that are assigned are independent of each other.
The compromise of one session key will compromise only the messages encrypted with
that session key, and not messages belonging to other sessions that were encrypted
with different session keys.
The QKD technology prevents key material from being made accessible by the
attacker. Suppose that an attacker Eve attempts to interfere with the protocol. Eve
will be unable to access the quantum key pools, as they are externally inaccessible,
and will thus be unable to read the QKD-generated key material. Furthermore, Eve
will be unable to contribute any invalid key material to the pools, as the QKD process
cannot be successfully interfered with. Also, the KMS is accessible only within its
own site through its published external interface API; it is not externally accessible
from parties outside of its network domain and firewall. The KMS operates within a
physically secured environment that protects physical access to the computer hardware
responsible for the KMS and quantum key pool storage.
The policy engine enforces rules for the issuance and use of key material. The
policy engine can enforce what cipher to use for host communication, the minimum
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key length, and the usable lifetime of the session key. Furthermore, the policy engine
can validate a remote host before issuing the session key. Different hosts on different
sites may be associated with different sets of permissions. These permissions may
indicate the required levels of security for host-to-host communication to be carried
out.
When utilizing the session keys issued by the KMS to encrypt host traffic, a
suitable symmetric-key algorithm can be utilized, such as the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [17]. The cipher will be initialized with the session key issued by
the KMS. The cipher will provide privacy of host information. The security schemes
presented do not rely upon public-key cryptography, which is considered vulnerable
to successful attack by a quantum computer. The schemes rely upon pre-shared
symmetric keys only; the keys are generated on both hosts through QKD, which is
considered secure based on the laws of quantum physics.
4.4. Combination with Post-Quantum Algorithms
It is important to note that exclusive reliance on QKD may not be justifiable. In
fact, QKD augments well the conventional post-quantum ecosystem; the aim is not
to have QKD replace it. QKD protocols are fundamentally and provably secure
against cryptanalysis and keys remain secure forever from the time of creation,
as the technology is based on the laws of quantum physics; however, practical
implementations of QKD may possess vulnerabilities. The principal problem in
practice is that QKD requires special hardware and has limited key rate over long
distance, so that it is likely not suitable for providing key material for one-time pad
encryption for large volumes of data in an enterprise setting. Post-quantum public key
cryptography‡, on the other hand, requires no new infrastructure, and works within a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Both QKD protocols and post-quantum algorithms
are an active research area and there is a long road ahead to build confidence in
primitives and implementations, and to define standards; thus, they are not yet ready
for widespread commercial use.
A possible key construction strategy to diversify risk is to combine the two
techniques:
(i) Firstly, as suggested in section 4.2, quantum-safe algorithms authenticate the
QKD channel via PKI. In this case, future cryptanalysis of the post-quantum
authentication does not compromise the security of the QKD key established
before the post-quantum algorithm was broken. In other words, one only relies
on the short-term security of the post-quantum algorithm.
(ii) Secondly, post-quantum algorithms and QKD are used independently to create
two session keys; the two keys are combined, such as through an exclusive OR
operation, so that an attacker must break both. In this case, if either the QKD
or the post-quantum key generation become vulnerable, the overall security is
not compromised. Furthermore, each type of key generation would certainly
have to fail in a different way. This solution is consistent with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) approving the use of quantum-
resistant cryptography in FIPS-140 approved systems, as long as the hybrid
solution includes one FIPS-validated algorithm [38].
‡To avoid ambiguity, the term “quantum-safe algorithms” is not used, as QKD is also considered
to be quantum-safe.
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5. Lessons Learned and Recommendations
We propose that our four-layered architecture is a valuable framework for the QKD
community to facilitate the advancement and adoption of QKD in practical network
systems. There is a myriad of QKD technologies that are still evolving; a flexible
framework can accommodate any QKD technology without rework, and disruption to
the entire tool chain is avoided. End-users may design their applications to obtain
QKD-generated keys from a KMS without adapting to changes in the inner workings
of the KMS, or the QNL algorithms and topology, or the underlying QLL technologies.
Our design is not generic in nature; rather, it is highly customized for the
challenges of QKD. It maximizes the security benefits of QKD while mitigating its
limitations. Because the quantum key generation rate is still relatively lower than
in conventional cryptosystems, there needs to be flexibility in how quantum key
material is consumed; the policy engine can dictate various key consumption strategies.
Since hosts may wish to communicate across the entire network, it is useful to have
intermediate nodes assist with key generation. Because the demand for keys may
continually change, the system must adapt by deciding when to run QKD, using what
paths in the network, and for how long.
The size of investment in QKD technology and infrastructure is an important
consideration. To minimize the switching cost and to speed up adoption, it may be best
to integrate with existing security and authentication protocols and standards. The
use of shared infrastructure, such as multiplexing the QKD protocol with conventional
user traffic on a shared fibre-optic line, is another tenet of rationalization and fast
ramp-up.
Our recommendations for designing and implementing a QKD-based system in
the future would be to design in a manner that is agnostic to the underlying QKD
technology. Running the system as a set of micro-services will provide plug-and-play
modularity within the layered architecture. The use of both QKD and quantum-safe
algorithms enables sufficient session keys to be generated for a large host population
that is governed by policy rules.
Finally, it is important to create a system that can effectively scale and support
popular use cases. Optimizing the key generation activity based on real-time demand
monitoring ensures maximum utilization of the security infrastructure. Defining
flexible security levels and associated key issuance strategies will result in more efficient
consumption of keys.
A useful performance metric is the key generation rate for an arbitrary pair
of nodes that are not directly connected. The rate is upper-bounded by the
implemented QKD technology, but the network designer has the opportunity to
improve performance to a degree through sound network engineering. Possibilities
include reducing the number of hops in the paths between source and destination
pairs experiencing higher demand, increasing the capacity of key quantum links, and
utilizing more optimal network topologies that are highly meshed. Agile networking
such as software-defined networks with centrally-managed intelligence and control can
help optimize in this regard.
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